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Abstract
Systemically important banks are connected and have dynamic dependencies of their
default probabilities. An extraction of default factors from cross-sectional credit default
swaps (CDS) curves allows to analyze the shape and the dynamics of the default probabili-
ties. Extending the Dynamic Nelson Siegel (DNS) model, we propose a network DNS model
to analyze the interconnectedness of default factors in a dynamic fashion, and forecast the
CDS curves. The extracted level factors representing long-term default risk demonstrate
85.5% total connectedness, while the slope and the curvature factors document 79.72% and
62.94% total connectedness for the short-term and middle-term default risk, respectively.
The issues of default spillover and systemic risk should be weighted for the market partic-
ipants with longer credit exposures, and for regulators with a mission to stabilize financial
markets. The US banks contribute more to the long-run default spillover before 2012,
whereas the European banks are major default transmitters during and after the European
debt crisis either in the long-run or short-run. The outperformance of the network DNS
model indicates that the prediction on CDS curve requires network information.
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1 Introduction
Probability of default (PD) is the likelihood of a default with respect to obligations over a
particular time horizon. A PD ’curve’ used to map PDs with horizons typically shows an
upward slope, although occasionally it may display a downward slope to signal a severe
credit deterioration in the short-run relative to long-run. The PD curve varies in time and
as in the analysis of term structure for CDS spreads, carries information on comovements
and common factors. An extraction of common factors from cross-sectional credit default
swaps (CDS) spreads allows to analyze the shape and the dynamics of the PD. To be
more specific, the shape of PD curve can be parsimoniously inferred by projecting the
cross-sectional CDS spreads with different maturities to a few numbers of factors. The
dynamics of curves and their interplay which is casted into network topology reflecting
the interdependency in a controllable dimensionality.
This study strives to analyze the term structure of CDS spreads (or CDS curves) in
several aspects (1) extract the short-Term(ST), middle-Term(MT) and long-Term(LT)
default factor from CDS curves; (2) quantify their comovements and identify the firms
being downgraded simultaneously; (3) model the default spillover in the ST, MT and LT
perspective, respectively; (4) predict the CDS curves based on the calibrated dynamics.
The initial question tagging on the above attempts is why one needs to look at the
CDS spreads and its information content. Han and Zhou (2015) pointed out the various
advantages of CDS over bond spreads: CDS spreads are not subject to the specification
of benchmark risk-free yield curve (Longstaff et al., 2005), less contaminated by non-
default risk components (Ericsson et al., 2009) and have better price discovery in credit
condition (Blanco et al., 2005). Most notably, the default intensity and recovery rate
of a bond can be derived, based on a number of CDS spreads pricing models, from the
market prices of CDS spreads. The CDS curve yields information on the risk-neutral
default probability over different time horizons. Market participants rely on this curve to
interpret the market ’expectation’ of default risk in different time frames (ST, MT, LT),
to manage credit risk and to design credit derivative contracts. Moreover, analogous
with interest rate expectations hypothesis, the difference between current LT and ST
CDS spreads can be used to predict future changes in ST CDS spreads.
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The proposal made here is to employ a factor model with shapes as in the Dynamic
Nelson-Siegel (DNS). The derived latent factors are time series with the dynamics por-
trayed, and can be estimated by a two-stages least square procedure or by a state space
approach. The economic underpinning of the DNS model is that the three latent factors
distilled from cross-sectional CDS spreads over maturities ideally represent the ST, the
MT and the LT factor in terms of default. Having these extracted common factors, one
can dive directly into the credit horizons of interest.
Nowadays the fear of default risk is transferring from an individual case into a systemic
impact which is more likely to break down the architecture of financial interdependence.
For example, a default event of a bank can be regarded as systemic if its failure or extreme
turbulence results in a directly widespread distress or indirectly triggers a contagion. This
issue is of importance for financial industry due to their correlated exposure holdings or
direct interbank obligations, this is the very reason in this research we focus our sample
on the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). To stabilize financial markets,
Financial Stability Board (FSB) strives to identify the systemic important ones and rank
the financial institutions in terms of their systemic relevance. To address this issue,
we develop and apply a unified framework, namely "the network topology of variance
decompositions", for quantifying default spillover, contagion or interconnectedness. Given
the ST, MT and LT credit factor extracted from the DNS model, it is of interest to
what extent the credit condition of bank i is subject to its past credit but also the credit
conditions of other banks due to interbank relationship. Will credit spillover or contagion
evenly be observed in the ST or LT credit horizon or both? Can we use this information
to foresee crisis and evaluate the tension embedded in the credit assets with different
maturities?
It’s worthwhile to relate the aforementioned issues to CDS pricing and forecast. Pricing
CDS contracts is suggested to take credit spillover into account, especially for the reference
entities whose default intensity is vulnerable to others. Likewise, one may produce better
out-of-sample forecast performance in CDS curve with this consideration. Note that the
forecast here is for an entire curve instead of a point prediction. The forecast is valuable
for the counterparties in the both sides of CDS contract. For buyers, the forecast is very
decisive for the timing of gauging a CDS contract to hedge credit risk at the earlier stage
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of default likelihood. They can benefit through a relatively lower insurance payment.
For sellers, with default network information, they avoid underestimating CDS spreads.
We will demonstrate the forecast implementation in the later section. This study also
contributes to the bondholders with different time horizons of credit exposures; to policy
makers with policy goals setting for the ST and the LT perspective; to the portfolio
managers for diversifying their bond portfolios; and to credit agencies for rating firms’
credits in different time frames.
Our primary findings are:(1) G-SIBs banks have comoving credit curves with high con-
nectedness, especially in the long-term. The US banks contribute more to the long-term
default spillover before 2012, whereas the European banks are major default transmitters
during and after the European debt crisis either in the long-term or short-term. (2) the
time-varying total default connectedness serves as an indicator for systemic risk, espe-
cially for identifying a clustering default subsystem. The TED spread, credit spread and
VIX are main determinants of default connectedness. (3) The network-based DNS model,
relative to the DNS model, yields better out-of-sample prediction for CDS curves.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the network-based DNS model is
introduced in Section 2, model estimation is detailed in Section 3. Section 4 describes
the data and offers preliminary analysis. We summarize the empirical results and detail
the analysis of static and dynamic connectedness measures in Section 5. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
2 Modeling framework
The beginning of this section details the procedures of modeling the CDS curves with
Dynamic Nelson Siegel (DNS) framework, in which the three Nelson Siegel parameters,
i.e., level, slope and curvature, can be viewed as the long, medium and short term factor
of the CDS curves. Further, to tackle systemic default, credit contagion or spillover, and
network connectedness of default, we utilize the Diebold-Yilmaz connectedness measures,
which rely on the variance decompositions in a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. In ad-
dition, the out-of-sample forecasting framework with or without other bank’s information
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are also introduced.
2.1 Fitting the CDS curve via the Dynamic Nelson Siegel model
2.1.1 A factor model representation
Nelson and Siegel (1987) propose a PCA based parsimonious three factor model for
modelling the cross-sectional yields at any point. Diebold and Li (2006) extend this into
the DNS framework and find excellent forecasting properties for interest rates. Diebold
et al. (2006) model the yield curve via a state space factorization and find strong influences
from macro variables.
Likewise, the CDS curves have a similar term structure framework so that a natural
progression is an application of the CDS curves (Shaw et al., 2014; Krishnan et al., 2010).
Define yit(τ) as the nominal CDS spreads of financial institution i on a vector comprised of
τ− period maturities. τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τk) = (6M, 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 7Y, 10Y, 20Y, 30Y ),
k = 10. The DNS factorization for a single financial institute i at time point t is,










































where the disturbance vector υit = [υit(τ1), υit(τ2), · · · , υit(τk)]> and εit = (εlit, εsit, εci,t)>.
The parameter matrix αi is diagonal in transition equation. δ the constant decay factor
(here δ = 0.0609). We varied the decay factors and estimated it for each bank, however
it changes little on the results, therefore, for simplicity it is set to be a constant. yit(τ) is
the so-called term structure of CDS spreads or CDS curve of institution i at time t.
The three DNS parameters lit, sit, and cit can be interpreted as LT, ST, and MT latent
factors. Since the factor loading on lit is 1, which is a constant and the same for all
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maturities, lit can be viewed as the long-term or level factor. Any increase in lit will cause
the entire curve to shift upwards, representing the ’level’ and ’long-run’ components of
credit curve. The factor loading of sit is 1−exp(−δi τ)δi τ , starting from 1 and exponentially
deceasing to 0, can be viewed as the ST factor. The ’slope’ of credit curve is changing
accordingly. The loading of cit is 1−exp(−δi τ)δi τ − exp(−δi τ), a function which starts from
0 then increases and decays to 0, hence it is the MT factor. In sum, the shape of the
credit curve is captured by these three factors. A time-varying shape is reflected by the
changing loads on the three factors.
For the purpose of depicting the interplay of projected factors among banks, one has
the challenge to calibrate the dynamics of lit, sit, and cit as e.g. a VAR(1) process. This
motivates us to study dynamically evolving lit, sit, and cit. Ideally, the DNS model for each
bank immediately forms a state-space system as expressed in (2). Motivated by PCA, we
assume the level factor, the slope, and the curvature factor are orthogonal. The parameter
matrix αi is diagonal in transition equation. For this state space system, we will resort to
the Kalman filter estimation method. We, therefore, assume the disturbance vector υit
and εit to be independent and both follow a normal distribution with covariance matrix
Qi and Σi respectively. By doing so, one can distill the entire CDS curves, period by
period, into three dynamically evolving dimensional parameters and model their interplay
characterized by a VAR(1) process.
2.2 Network topology of DNS factors
Joint default may become systemic in the moment as banks call for bailout together or
even go bankrupt sequentially. The fact of correlated default and default spillover draws
more attention (see Duffie et al. (2009); Duan and Miao (2015)). Due to interbank loans
and shared credit exposures, a default risk of one bank can easily spread to others. The
speed and scope of spread is subject to bank’s systemic importance. We introduce a
network topology of variance decomposition to measure the ’credit connectedness’ which
quantifies the scope of ’default risk transmission’. The embedded dynamics mechanism
allows us to evaluate the speed of default risk transmission.
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2.2.1 Approximating model - VAR




Akxt−k + ut, ut ∼ i.i.d.N(0,Σ) (3)
xt =(x1t, x2t, · · · , xNt)> (4)
where xt represents lt = (l1t, l2t, · · · , lNt)>, st = (s1t, s2t, · · · , sNt)>, ct = (c1t, c2t, · · · , cNt)>.
N is the number of banks, in our case, N = 10. The autoregression matrix Ak is N ×N
dimensional, p denotes the lag order of VAR. If the lag order is identically equal to 1 for
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It is well known that the VAR model (3) (if stationary) can be written as xt = Θ(L)ut,
Θ(L) = Θ0 + Θ1L + ...ΘhLh + ..., Θi = A1Θi−1 + A2Θi−2 + · · · + ApΘi−p, where Θ0 and
A0 are N ×N identity matrix, Ai = 0 for i < 0. This representation allows us to extract
connectedness information. Following Diebold and Yılmaz (2014), we resort to apply this
variance decomposition to establish a network structure.
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2.2.2 Pairwise directional default connectedness
Default connectedness measures the shares of forecast error variation due to shocks arising
from others. This is captured by the variance decomposition, in which the forecast error
variance of variable i is decomposed into parts attributed to the remaining variables in
the system. The generalized variance decomposition (GVD) (Koop et al., 1996) yields
d̃ij(H) as the ij−th H−step component, which represents the fraction of bank i’s H−step





h=0 (e>i ΘhΣΘ>h ei)
(8)
where σjj is the jth diagonal element in the covariance matrix Σ of the error vector ut,
that is, the standard deviation of the error term of jth equation, and ej = (0, 0, ..., 1, ..., 0),
a zero vector except jth element unity. H denotes the forecast horizon.
Since the sum of d̃ij(H) in each equation does not necessarily equal to unit, that is,∑N





Define the pairwise directional credit connectedness from bank j to bank i as Ci←j =
dij(H), and note that in general Ci←j 6= Cj←i. This leads finally to the connectedness in
Table 1,
Table 1: Connectedness table
x1 x2 · · · xN From others
x1 d11 d12 · · · d1N
∑N
j=1 d1j, j 6= 1
x2 d21 d22 · · · d2N
∑N
j=1 d2j, j 6= 2
... ... ... . . . ... ...
xN dN1 dN2 · · · dNN
∑N
j=1 dNj, j 6= N
To others ∑Ni=1 di1 ∑Ni=1 di2 · · · ∑Ni=1 diN 1N ∑Ni,j=1 dij
i 6= 1 i 6= 2 i 6= N i 6= j
Note that a higher H horizon in a higher prediction error variance, a higher value of
Ci←j. When H is very small, it limits Ci←j to short periods. On the other hand, as H
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increases the corresponding Ci←j increases slightly due to the incrementally less valuable
conditioning information. For the case H → ∞, one obtains an unconditional variance
decomposition. To strike a balance between these effects, we select H = 12. It is close
to the time period (10 days) of value at risk (VaR) required under the Basel accord, and
also in the practical rebalancing interval of portfolio management. In the empirical part,
we also calculate the results for a range of horizons, it turns out that when H is larger
than a certain value, around 10, Ci←j increases trivially. We can provide a robustness
check for other H if required.
2.2.3 Interpreting the connectedness
Consider as an example of the first row of Table 1, the sum of the off-diagonal dij, j 6= i
of bank 1 accounts for shocks attributed to other banks, while as for the first column, the
sum of di1, j 6= 1 indicates the risk contribution of bank 1. Total directional connectedness










The net default connectedness i is the difference ’To’ and ’From’:
Ci = C•←i − Ci←• (12)






Note that there are N ’To’ and ’From’ net connectedness adding up to total connected-
ness. Economically speaking, as C increases, banks spread default risk mutually. Hence,
C in (13) is a quantitative measure of default spillover or contagion in a system.
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2.3 Out-of-sample forecasts
To evaluate the informativeness of the predefined network connectedness, it is of interest
to compare the forecasting performance between the network-based DNS model and the
conventional DNS model. Using (3) one predicts:












where β̂is,t, s = 1, 2, 3 denotes l̂it, ŝit, ĉit respectively, and can be estimated through (1)
and (2).
The autoregressive process of transition equation without the influence from the latent
factors of other banks, named as DNS-AR(1),
β̂is,t+h|t = γ̂0is + γ̂is β̂is,t (15)
As the forecast model comparison, the transition equation in a multivariate factor frame-
work to undertake their interaction, named as DNS-VAR(1),
β̂is,t+h|t = γ̂0is + γ̂is β̂is,t + φ̂js β̂js,t, j 6= i (16)
where β̂js,t is the latent factors from other banks j, which are estimated in the initial
step, such as using (1) and (2). The parameter γ̂0is, γ̂is and φ̂js are estimated by Kalman
filter method. Technical details are specified in appendix.
3 Model Estimation
The VAR approximating model of default intensity factor connectedness has a natural
state-space model representation. If we pool all the banks together, the measurement
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and transition equations are
Yt = HXt + υt (17)































































Meanwhile, when level, slope and curvature factors are orthogonal with autoregressive
process of order one, the parameter matrix F is,
F =

αl11 0 0 αl12 0 0 · · · αl1N 0 0
0 αs11 0 0 αs12 0 · · · 0 αs1N 0
... ... ... ... ... ... · · · ... ... ...




which accommodates (2), (5), (6), and (7).
We introduce a two-step estimation method that couples the DNS model with the variance
decomposition technique: In the first step, we estimate the dynamic level factor lit, the
slope factor sit, and the curvature factor cit for each bank i through the Kalman filter
estimation of the state space model, based on equation (1) and (2); In the second step, by
utilizing the network framework based on variance decomposition in Diebold and Yılmaz
(2014), we investigate the dynamics of LT, ST and MT default factors in a network
perspective, based on equation (3). In order to uncover the dynamics of the network
connectedness, we use a rolling window estimation for the each factors.
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4 Data
We firstly discuss the information content of CDS spreads that provides the theoreti-
cal foundations for using CDS, and then perform preliminary analysis to support the
motivations in the subsequent study.
4.1 Implied default intensity in CDS spreads
The basic pricing formula for CDS contracts is to achieve the payoff balance between
CDS buyers and CDS sellers. Consider a CDS contract with the maturity of M years
and quarterly premium payments. CDSt(M) denotes the annualized spread at issue. L is
the risk-neutral expected loss of the notional value in the event of default. We normalize
the notional face value of the contract as 1. λt denotes the risk-neutral arrival rate of
a credit event, i.e., default intensity. Then, at issue, the present value of CDS-provider




























where rt is the risk free rate. Pan and Singleton (2008) assumed the s years time discount






, and presumed the conditional survival probability q(s)
follows
q(s) = exp (−λts) (22)























Combing (23) and (22), we can directly imply the default intensity from CDS spreads,






It is noteworthy that the explicit relationship between default intensity and CDS spreads,
such as in (24), is only satisfied under certain assumptions, such as constant loss given
default L, and survival probability q(s) in (22). Since implied default intensity is naturally
dependent on predetermined model set-up, we thoroughly focus on CDS spreads as a
direct indicator of default intensity (see Equation (24)), to get rid of the potential model
misspecification risk. Besides, through CDS spreads investigation, it also permits us to
perform an out-of-sample forecast and practice a convenient comparison.
4.2 CDS spreads data
We draw our attention to the CDS spreads belonging to the Top 10 of the global sys-
temically important banks (G-SIBs), i.e., N = 10, for their plenty maturities in CDS
contracts. In Table 2, the CDS spreads with maturities ranging from 6 months, 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 20, 30 years are available via DataStream. These 10 banks are selected
out of the thirty-four G-SIBs based on the availability of sufficient maturities of CDS.
Banks with less than the 10 maturities of CDS are excluded from the study to ensure the
representative ability of latent factors. The sample period is selected from January 1st,
2008 to December 31th, 2015, at daily frequency.
Table 2: Banks
Institution Ticker Country
1 Bank of America BAC United States
2 Citygroup C United States
3 Goldman Sachs GS United States
4 J.P.Morgan JPM United States
5 Wells Fargo WFC United States
6 Deutsche Bank DB Germany
7 Commerzbank CBG Germany
8 Barclays Bank BCS United Kingdom
9 HSBC Bank HBC United Kingdom
10 UBS UBS Switzerland
Note: List of banks under study.
Figure 1 depicts a 3D plot of the time-varying CDS spread curves of Goldman Sachs and
HSBC Bank. The display of the CDS curves for the banks is depicted in Figure 10 in
Appendix. The CDS curves display apparently substantial level movements across time,
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and they also exhibit a clear commonality to support the notion of credit comovement.
One can observe a simultaneous increase of credit curve into banks during the Eurozone
debt crisis periods, which motivates us to analyse the connectedness across banks.
Figure 1: CDS spreads data
Note: (log) Credit default swap spreads 2008.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data for Goldman Sachs and
HSBC Bank across 10 maturities. The data in our study is after logarithm transformation.
DDINetwork_CDS
4.3 Preliminary analysis of CDS spreads
In summary, there are 26 free parameters to be estimated: the 3× 3 transition matrix of
the three state variables containing 9 free parameters, the mean state variables contain-
ing 3 free parameters, the 1 decay parameter in measurement equation, the diagonal of
disturbance covariance matrix of transition equation containing 10 free parameters with
each covariance for the counterpart of 10 maturities of CDS spreads, and the 3 free pa-
rameters constituting from the diagonal of measurement disturbance covariance matrix
with each for one of the 3 latent variables.
We use the Kalman filter to derive the state variables and CDS spreads of next stage, after
which we proceed to evaluate the unknown parameters with the maximum likelihood esti-
mation under Gaussian distribution assumptions for the disturbance of measurement and
transition equations. The initial parameter values are obtained by using the Diebold-Li
two-step ordinary least squares regression and the startup value for the decay parameter
is 0.0609. The estimated decay parameters are varying across banks.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the estimated DNS factors, which will be used
14
Figure 2: DNS factors
Note: Data period: 2008.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data. The upper panel collects the level factors,
middle panel for the slope factors, and the bottom panel for the curvature factors.
DDINetwork_network_static
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the estimated DNS factor.
Factor Mean Std.dev. Min Max ρ(5) ρ(10)
Bank of America
lt 5.156 0.327 3.962 6.039 0.920 0.867
st -1.475 1.160 -3.613 1.181 0.989 0.976
ct 0.894 0.921 -1.150 3.414 0.976 0.946
Citygroup
lt 5.242 0.270 4.273 6.379 0.891 0.827
st -1.486 1.146 -3.731 0.944 0.989 0.978
ct 1.040 0.799 -0.823 3.276 0.972 0.944
Goldman Sachs
lt 5.175 0.323 3.867 6.498 0.914 0.854
st -1.207 1.123 -3.273 0.914 0.989 0.977
ct 0.751 0.822 -0.497 3.817 0.976 0.949
J.P.Morgan
lt 4.841 0.329 3.651 5.631 0.951 0.916
st -1.717 1.029 -3.736 0.738 0.985 0.971
ct 1.198 0.817 -0.083 4.275 0.966 0.932
Wells Fargo
lt 4.841 0.197 4.067 5.621 0.868 0.777
st -1.868 1.232 -5.051 0.718 0.977 0.959
ct -0.932 1.228 -3.984 1.453 0.985 0.969
Deutsche Bank
lt 4.864 0.267 4.151 5.754 0.930 0.880
st -1.558 0.974 -4.344 0.420 0.975 0.953
ct 1.405 1.054 -0.589 5.226 0.954 0.916
Commerzbank
lt 5.027 0.439 3.927 5.898 0.966 0.945
st -1.436 0.997 -3.893 0.307 0.984 0.969
ct 0.996 0.885 -0.361 4.757 0.965 0.932
Barclays Bank
lt 4.933 0.353 4.048 5.764 0.938 0.902
st -1.394 0.908 -3.464 0.385 0.979 0.959
ct 1.345 0.934 -0.480 4.166 0.955 0.912
HSBC Bank
lt 4.778 0.321 3.948 5.329 0.972 0.945
st -1.381 1.014 -6.551 0.180 0.931 0.887
ct -2.058 1.194 -6.017 0.472 0.959 0.927
UBS
lt 4.819 0.325 4.023 5.819 0.946 0.891
st -1.540 1.101 -4.462 0.305 0.983 0.965
ct 1.585 1.295 -0.277 6.928 0.964 0.927
Note: ρ(5) and ρ(10) denote the autocorrelation coefficients with the lag of 5 or 10 periods.
DDINetwork_network_static
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in the subsequent network analysis. The level factors present least variance compared
with the slope and curvature factors. The factor autocorrelations reveal that all factors
display persistent dynamics, with the level more persistent than the slope. Although the
level, the slope and the curvature factors behave distinctly, they clearly display a certain
degrees of similarity across banks, as shown in Figure 2.
The basis for the network analysis is the possible existence of co-movements in the factor
dynamics across banks, implying the exist of potential spillover effects or underlying
transmission mechanism. To investigate this, we plot the estimated factors for all banks
in Figure 2. The upper, middle and bottom panel present the level, the slope and the
curvature factor, respectively. To visualize the difference across the banks in the US and
Europe, we feature the factors of 5 US banks with solid line, while the counterparts of
European banks in dashed line. Figure 2 reveals clear evidence of co-movements in factors
dynamics, especially for the level and slope factor. One can observe that the slope/ST
factors across 10 G-SIBs have climbed since the outbreak of the European debt crisis,
indicating possible inverted credit curves (downward slope curves).
5 Empirical results
To characterize the evolution of the default risk connectedness among the US and Euro-
pean banks, we proceed to a four steps analysis: we firstly perform a full-sample analysis
separately for level, slope, and curvature factor, to assess the unconditional or average
connectedness. After this static connectedness analysis, a rolling-window sample analysis
is conducted for the three factors respectively, to portray the dynamics of conditional
connectedness. By doing so, one can monitor the dynamics of spillover effect between the
US and European banks over time. Using the total connectedness in the rolling-sample
framework as an indicator of systematic default risk, we analyse the sources of the sys-
tematic risk. Finally, having the predefined connectedness among bank default risk, we
report the forecasting performance when incorporating the factors from other banks.
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5.1 Network: static
Systemic risk is not easy to define, but the universally accepted characteristics are that
it has large impact; is widespread, and has a ripple effect that endangers the financial
system. Network analysis enables us to cover three major concepts of systemic risk by
portraying the interplay among financial institutions, measuring their interconnectedness
and quantifying the spillover effect.
Interconnectedness of financial institutions on the interbank market is an absolute key to
understanding systemic risk. Interconnectedness captures the situations when financial
distress in one institution subsequently raises the likelihood of financial distress in other
institutions because of their network of contractual relations and interbank lending among
them, leading to a ’too-interconnected-to-fail’ situation. The resulting connectedness
parameters like C from (13), therefore, can be used to monitor systemic vulnerability.
In the following analysis, we examine the interconnectedness and spillover with respect
to the default factors in the ST, MT and LT perspective. This effort can help to answer
the questions e.g. Will credit spillover or contagion evenly be observed in the short-term
and long-term credit horizon? Can we use this information to foresee crisis and evaluate
the tension embedded in the credit assets with different maturities?
5.1.1 Level factor
Table 4 reports the full-sample connectedness of level factors. As the level factors capture
the long-term component of CDS spreads, the entries in Table 4 turn to be the long-term
directional connectedness measures. Many features are revealed. Blocks of high pairwise
directional connectedness are notable, especially for the US banks. The values in the
first five columns, which captures the spillover effect contributed to the US banks, are
apparently higher than that of European banks. The total connectedness for level factor
is on average 85.50%. In addition, the ’From’ degree distribution is noticeably less volatile
than the ’To’ degree distribution in the case of the US group, but it is not a case for the
EU group. Through this table, one can find the US banks are exporting LT default risk
to the EU ones.
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Table 4: Static Connectedness: Level factor
BAC C GS JPM WFC DB CBG BCS HBC UBS FROM
BAC 19.95 14.00 13.27 12.39 12.84 6.79 5.01 5.27 5.06 5.43 80.05
C 16.85 17.91 14.13 13.05 13.47 5.98 4.14 4.76 4.65 5.05 82.09
GS 16.46 18.54 20.03 14.03 14.95 3.58 2.39 2.74 3.48 3.81 79.97
JPM 17.42 17.73 16.22 15.67 15.17 4.12 2.96 3.11 3.76 3.83 84.33
WFC 16.16 16.35 15.05 14.57 15.88 5.27 3.81 3.96 4.38 4.56 84.12
DB 11.82 13.05 12.26 11.61 11.06 12.28 6.50 7.02 6.96 7.45 87.72
CBG 10.29 10.84 10.84 9.81 9.47 12.29 12.49 8.26 7.58 8.13 87.51
BCS 8.84 10.46 10.22 9.57 8.99 12.97 8.40 12.71 8.55 9.29 87.29
HBC 11.37 12.94 12.45 11.48 11.10 10.05 7.05 8.12 7.88 7.56 92.12
UBS 11.27 12.57 11.74 10.89 10.40 10.45 6.03 8.98 7.44 10.23 89.77
TO 120.47 126.48 116.17 107.40 107.44 71.49 46.30 52.23 51.87 55.11 85.50
NET 40.42 44.39 36.20 23.07 23.33 -16.23 -41.22 -35.07 -40.25 -34.65 -
Note: Data period: 2008.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data.
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Let us discuss some of the features of the long-term connectedness table in more detail.
The highest observed pairwise connectedness is from C to GS (CGS←C = 18.54%), while
in return, the pairwise connectedness from GS to C (CC←GS) is slightly small 14.13%.
The next highest pairwise connectedness is from C to JPM (CJPM←C = 17.73%), which
is slightly higher than the pairwise connectedness from BAC to JPM (BACJPM←C =
17.42%). The bank C has the largest market capitalization before the 2008 financial
crisis periods, it is reasonable that the total connectedness to others are largest. The
bank with bigger market capitalization is more capable of offering interbank loans to
other banks, it is so-called ’too big to fail’. On the other hand, the long-term pairwise
directional connectedness among European banks is relatively smaller (less than 10%),
except a few relatively large measures from DB to BCS (CBCS←DB = 12.97%), and from
DB to CBG (CCBG←DB = 12.29%).
The ’From’ column is the row sum of the pairwise connectedness except the own-effects
(diagonal elements of the matrix). It reveals the total directional connectedness from
others to each of the ten banks. In other words, it captures the contribution of credit
shocks resulting from other banks to the total variance of the forecast error of bank i.
While the total directional connectedness is distributed tightly, the ’From’ effects of US
banks appear consistently smaller than that of the European banks, showing that the US
banks are less impacted by the EU credit shocks.
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The column sum of pairwise connectedness quantify the spillover effect of bank i to others.
By definition, each bank’s share in the forecast error variance of others is not compulsorily
to add up to 1, therefore, elements in the ’To’ row can exceed 100%. ’To’ effect varies
over banks, ranging from 126% to 46%. The largest commercial banks (as of 2008) were
the ones that have the highest values of connectedness to others. C generated the largest
default transmission, 126%, to others. This is consistent with the findings in
Diebold and Yılmaz (2014), which is based on the volatility of stock returns among US
financial institutes. Besides, the five US banks all generate significant (exceeding 100%)
long-term default risk spillover to others, compared with European banks, which evidently
imply the transmission of long-term default risk shocks from the US financial institutions
to the European counterparts.
Further, the strong spillover effects between the connectedness of US and European banks
are clearly observed in their ’Net’ row. The difference between the total directional con-
nectedness to others and the total directional from others results in the net total direc-
tional connectedness to others. C leads the highest net total directional connectedness
(44.39%), followed by BAC (40.42%), with other positive effects of US banks. By contrast,
the values of net total directional connectedness in European banks are significantly neg-
ative, indicating that the contributions of European banks shock to other banks’ forecast
error variance are generally trivial in term of the long run default risk.
5.1.2 Slope factor
The short-term connectedness is shown in Table 5. The highest observed directional
connectedness is CJPM←HBC = 33.71%, followed by CCBG←HBC = 22.48%. Being one of
the most vulnerable banks during the European debt crisis, HSBC Bank clearly spreads
its tail stress to other banks.
One observes above that Bank of America is weakly effected by the shocks from others,
with only CBAC←· = 53.35%. Although in the short run, banks in the same region still
have relatively large connectedness compared with the cross-region connectedness, little
evidence of a consistent spillover effects from US to Europe as we have found in the
long-run investigation. Different from Table 4, HBC creates the strongest risk spillover,
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Table 5: Static Connectedness: Slope factor
BAC C GS JPM WFC DB CBG BCS HBC UBS FROM
BAC 46.65 11.91 8.89 7.71 4.36 4.94 4.66 2.97 4.20 3.72 53.35
C 12.66 15.97 7.80 9.58 9.54 8.19 6.87 7.91 16.05 5.44 84.03
GS 12.20 14.42 9.73 11.00 9.83 9.74 7.55 7.87 10.72 6.93 90.27
JPM 7.00 8.76 3.72 12.13 6.42 10.56 5.48 8.52 33.71 3.70 87.87
WFC 10.08 13.86 6.86 13.84 17.56 8.27 6.26 7.12 10.68 5.48 82.44
DB 8.04 10.09 5.74 9.11 6.73 21.65 10.49 10.29 9.18 8.67 78.35
CBG 6.71 8.88 4.34 9.00 12.05 10.43 10.56 8.14 24.48 5.40 89.44
BCS 6.86 8.93 5.14 7.67 5.07 17.13 13.26 17.49 8.59 9.86 82.51
HBC 3.04 3.73 2.07 3.41 3.00 15.07 9.32 13.14 39.23 8.00 60.77
UBS 6.22 8.11 4.53 7.16 5.41 15.48 11.06 12.36 17.83 11.85 88.15
TO 72.81 88.67 49.09 78.48 62.41 99.81 74.95 78.31 135.43 57.21 79.72
NET 19.46 4.64 -41.18 -9.39 -20.02 21.45 -14.49 -4.20 74.67 -30.94 -
Note: Data period: 2008.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data.
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followed by DB, both were seriously hit especially during the European debt crisis. Con-
sistently, in terms of ’Net’ connectedness measures, HBC leads the head, 74.67%, while
the next highest is from DB. Besides the positive values of BAC and C, the negative
values are generated from other banks. In the end, the total connectedness is 79.72%,
which is slightly smaller than 85.50% derived in the long-term total connectedness.
5.1.3 Curvature factor
Table 6: Static Connectedness: Curvature factor
BAC C GS JPM WFC DB CBG BCS HBC UBS FROM
BAC 22.08 10.89 6.26 6.82 1.19 16.77 9.25 10.36 0.18 16.20 77.92
C 6.40 19.77 7.55 8.62 1.73 16.19 9.16 14.00 2.64 13.94 80.23
GS 10.83 18.24 14.09 9.34 3.53 15.65 7.11 8.35 3.77 9.10 85.91
JPM 14.59 17.26 4.77 31.00 7.07 5.12 3.82 5.56 6.62 4.19 69.00
WFC 5.47 4.60 0.76 8.19 40.90 1.40 0.69 1.69 33.18 3.13 59.10
DB 1.50 5.91 3.35 4.34 0.33 52.11 10.00 11.48 2.57 8.39 47.89
CBG 0.68 2.17 1.16 1.18 0.10 17.45 40.38 10.49 5.35 21.03 59.62
BCS 1.10 5.07 2.60 3.53 0.23 27.17 13.86 29.46 0.12 16.86 70.54
HBC 0.12 2.83 2.80 1.55 0.11 1.71 0.53 2.10 84.39 3.85 15.61
UBS 0.83 5.29 3.53 3.35 0.09 20.97 12.03 17.13 0.35 36.41 63.59
TO 41.52 72.26 32.78 46.92 14.38 122.44 66.45 81.17 54.77 96.69 62.94
NET -36.40 -7.97 -53.12 -22.09 -44.72 74.55 6.84 10.64 39.17 33.10 -
Note: Data period: 2008.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data.
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The middle term directional connectedness is summarized in Table 6. The total connect-
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edness, 62.94%, is obviously smaller than the short term and long term connectedness. In
terms of the pairwise directional connectedness, the values vary more widely, such as the
highest observed connectedness measure is from HBC to WFC (CWFC←HBC = 33.18%)
while in the return, the lowest one from WFC to HBC (CHBC←WFC = 0.09%) is nearly
zero. The spillover effect in this case is obviously ’asymmetric’. In the case of DB, one
can find its spillover power in the MT or ST, but not in LT (see Table 4). The default
tensions emphasizing on ST and MT imply that DB may hold more short-run risky loans
which endangers its short-run credit. Interestingly, the ’Net’ directional connectednesses
are uniformly positive among European banks compared with the consistent negative
ones in the US.
In a nutshell, the three DNS factors and their connectedness convey information w.r.t the
default risk at the particular credit horizons. For the bank like DB, the potential to have
credit deterioration and subsequently create spillover to others is more likely to happen
in the short term. However, in the longer term the credit condition becomes resilient and
has constrictive transmission as shown through a reverse spillover in its level factor.
5.2 Network: dynamics
The DNS model coupled with a topological network can be seen as a means of monitoring
systemic vulnerability. On the supervisory purpose, the updated assessment is even
more demanded. For this purpose, one studies the dynamics of connectedness in which
credit contagion can therefore be identified in time. Accordingly, they will be asked by
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
for additional loss absorption capacities to ensure the sufficiency of their common equities
in case of the default.
5.2.1 Time-varying total connectedness
Figure 3 presents time-varying connectedness, Ct, estimated via C from (13) in a one-
year (260 observations) rolling window size. It reveals clear default risk cycles. In the LT
perspective, the period of 2009 to middle-2014 exhibits a long lasting cycle, coinciding
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Figure 3: Rolling total connectedness
Note: Data period: 2009.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data. The DNS factors and the corresponding
dynamic of networks are computed by one-year rolling window estimation (260 observations). The
variance decomposition is performed by the forecast horizon with 12 days. The red line denotes the
smoothing line by one-week moving average.
DDINetwork_network_dynamic
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with the outbreak of European sovereign debt crisis. Despite short spells of recovery at
the end of 2014, an increasing connectedness signals a upcoming systemic risk starting
from middle-2015.
The long continuous cycle in the LT connectedness (upper panel) reveals similar patterns
compared with the short term total connectedness by the slope factor (middle panel). The
total connectedness declined from the high 90% to around 74% at the end of 2009, followed
by a raising period cycle of European debt crisis starting from end-2009 to beginning-
2011. It is a transmission cycle starting with the end of the previous disastrous 2007-08
financial crisis to signal an emerging European debt crisis. As the European debt crisis
becomes widespread with a systemic danger, the short term total connectedness measures
stick at the range of 85%-90% until the end of 2014. The banking industry suffered credit
tension again as Chinese stock market became out of control in June, 2015. A third of
the value of A-shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange was lost within one month and
intrigued a large collapse in global financial markets, leading to a concern on global
economy stability again. The LT, ST and MT connectedness all reflect systemic fear in
2015.
5.2.2 Time-varying risk contribution
Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 present the dynamics of individual default risk con-
tribution to total directional connectedness, which are quantified by equation (12) for
level factor, slope factor and curvature factor. One can interpret that bank i has higher
marginal risk contribution in the long-run default risk if the shock of level factor of bank i
contributes more on the forecasting errors of level factors of remaining banks. The upper
panel depicts ’To’ others, the middle panel displays ’From’ others, and the bottom panel
collects the ’Net’ results. In each panel the five US banks lie in the first row while other
five European banks are in the second row.
Except Bank of America, in Figure 4, the total directional connectedness ’To’ others
from US banks appears rising from 2008 until 2010, however, they show a downward
trend after 2010. Conversely, the directional connectedness ’To’ others from the five
European banks tends to substantially rise up during the period of 2010-15. Overall,
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Figure 4: Rolling connectedness: level factors
Note: Data period: 2009.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data. The DNS factors and the corresponding
dynamic of networks are computed by one-year rolling window estimation (260 observations). The
variance decomposition is performed by the forecast horizon with 12 days.
DDINetwork_network_dynamic
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the long-term default risk connectedness analysis documents a declined spillover effects
from US banks to others, in return, the default risk shocks resulting in the forecast error
variance are more and more remarkably transmitted from the European banks. This fact
may reflect the effort of the US banking authority on supervisory after the outbreak of
US subprime crisis.
Figure 5: Rolling connectedness: Slope
Note: Data period: 2009.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data. The DNS factors and the corresponding
dynamic of networks are computed by one-year rolling window estimation (260 observations). The
variance decomposition is performed by the forecast horizon with 12 days.
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Figure 5 reports a similar pattern of short term total directional connectedness dynamics.
In the short term default risk connectedness, the ’To’ effect from US banks, except Bank
of America, tend to fall roughly from 2012, after a rising trend during 2009-2012. In
reverse, the short-term ’To’ effect from European banks declined till 2012, subsequently
followed by a rising trend. In sum, the ’Net’ effect of US banks declines from 2012 after
a consistent rising while the ’Net’ effect of European banks shows a reverse patten. In
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other words, being analogous to the long term directional connectedness, in the short
term, the shocks arising from European banks tend to be dominantly transmitted to
others especially after 2012, which coincides with the burst of European sovereign debt
crisis during 2012-2013.
Figure 6: Rolling connectedness: curvature factors
Note: Data period: 2009.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data. The DNS factors and the corresponding
dynamic of networks are computed by one-year rolling window estimation (260 observations). The
variance decomposition is performed by the forecast horizon with 12 days.
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In the three figures, one can see that Bank of America during the period of 2014-15
creates a very promising the ’Net’ effect regardless of default horizons. Obviously, BAC
is a overwhelming default shock transmitter and needs to be asked for an additional
loss buffer. Due to the 2008 acquisition of Countrywide Finance, a high-flying mortgage
company that fueled many of the excesses of the housing boom, BAC took huge losses on
distressed Countrywide mortgages. In March, 2014, the bank announced unexpected $6
billion in mortgage related legal expenses. Additionally, another more than $16 billion
27
in penalties to settle claims also reported, which turned out to formally announced in
August. After these blows, in April, BAC disclosed an significant accounting error of $4
billion capital loss undetected for several years. The capital error weighed heavily on the
bank shares, which felled by more than 6% on that trading day, wiping out $10 billion in
market value, far more than the actual losses. This indicated the collapse of trust from
investors, which simultaneously triggered large shocks to other financial institutions.
5.2.3 Graphical representation
The network dynamics may be displayed graphically, where the node size and node color
are designed to capture the ’To’ effect. Meanwhile, directional edge thickness indicates
the strength of pairwise directional connectedness, while edge color does not vary with
edge weight. Consider 3 snapshots for 2008, 2011 and 2012 in Figure 7.
In 2008, the node size of US banks is apparently larger than that of EU banks, indicating
a credit spillover from the US. Besides, the thickness of edge weights implies that the
spillover effects are not only closely intertwined among US banks but also transmitted
to EU banks (e.g. from GS to DB or CBG, from BAC to CBG). This evidence did not
yet fade away at the end of 2011 where BAC, JPM, and C are still sizable. However,
the node sizes of European banks at the end of 2011 tend to enlarge compared with that
in 2008, owning to the continuous negative impact from Greece, Ireland, and Portugal
debt crisis. As the European sovereign debt crisis was in its peak at the end of 2012,
the European banks turns out to be enormously large, especially for the banks with big
market capitalization, such as DB, CBG, and BCS. Further, the edge thickness indicates
that the default risk shocks are mutually conducted not only among European banks,
but also substantially outflowed from EU banks to US Banks.
5.3 The network between US and European banks
In order to have a clear picture on the cross-region spillover effects, we look at two groups,
the US v.s. the EU banks, and analyse the dynamics of their default risk transmission.
Figure 8 reveals that the transmission of overall default risk shocks in the long term is
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Panel A 2008.12.30 Panel B 2011.12.30
Panel C 2012.12.30
Figure 7: Level pairwise directional connectedness network
Notes: Node size and node color indicate C•←i of the bank’s level factor. Edge thickness indicates the
pairwise directional connectedness. Edge color does not vary with edge weight.
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Figure 8: Dynamics of connectedness across US and Europe. The blue line presents the
measures from US banks to European banks; the red line presents the measures from
European banks to US banks. DDINetwork_network_US_EU
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getting increased from European banks to US banks since 2010, while that of the short
term has a crossing point in 2013 but fall down around 2014, seemingly followed by a
new cycle of rising up periods, which is consistent with Figure 3 and Figure 5. The
default shocks still originate from Europe even 5-6 years after the burst of the European
sovereign debt crisis.
5.4 The drivers of default connectedness
Having the dynamics of default connectedness in a system, we dive deeper to investigate
the determinants of this dynamics. In order to understand the evolution of systemic
default risk in banking industry and control it further, the policy makers may rely on the
model-implied indicators for monitoring the frailty of default in a system. In our analysis,
the total connectedness can be viewed as an overall measure of system default risk, in
which a high value implies widespread default risk. Hence, in this part, we take the total
connectedness derived from level factor, slope factor, and curvature factor in section 5.2.1
as a measure of long term, short term, and middle term systemic default risk respectively,
and opt for a vector of state variables to analyse what drive the systematic default risk.
We estimate the following regression on the basis of daily data for the determinants of
the connectedness of credit curves:
Cω,t = αω + β>ω Mt−1 + εω,t, εω,t ∼ N(0, σ2) (25)
where Cω,t denotes total connectedness of level factor, slope factor, and curvature factor
at time t respectively, ω = {l, s, c}. Mt−1 denotes state variables at time t− 1.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) propose to use the following macro published variables,
e.g. (1) The change in the three-month yield; (2) The change in the slope of the yield
curve, measured by the spread between the composite long-term bond yield and the
three-month bill rate; (3) A short-term TED spread, defined as the difference between
the three-month LIBOR rate and the three-month secondary market Treasury bill rate.
This spread measures short-term funding liquidity risk. (4) The change in the credit
spread between Moody’s Baa-rated bonds and the ten-year Treasury rate; (5) The daily
market return computed from the S&P500; (6) The daily real estate sector return in
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excess of the market financial sector return; (7) VIX; In addition we employ common
principal components (CPC) the average variance explained by the first principle com-
ponent through the common principle component approach (CPCA), see (Flury, 1984;
Fengler et al., 2003; Chen and Härdle, 2015). The CPC factor here is used to capture a
common factor which may not be directly observed.
Estimating PCs simultaneously in different groups (banks) can result in a joint dimension
reduction transformation, as well as yielding a joint eigenstructure across groups (banks).
The basic assumption of CPCA is that the space spanned by the eigenvectors is identical
across several groups (banks), whereas variances associated with the components are al-
lowed to vary. The CPCA essentially tests whether the principal components for different
banks are the same across different maturities. More formally, for the covariance matrix
across K different maturities of bank i, Ψi, the hypothesis of CPCA is:
HCPC : Ψi = ΓΛiΓ>, i = 1, ..., N (26)
where Ψi is K × K positive definite covariance matrix; Γ = (γ1, ..., γK) is an K × K
orthogonal eigenvector matrix, which is identical for N banks; Λi = diag(λi1, ..., λiK) is
an diagonal eigenvalues matrix of bank i. The estimation details are refered to Appendix
7.2. Through averaging the variance explained by first principal component of each
bank, we estimate the CPC variance explained variable using a fix rolling window of 260
observations, in line with the similar procedure in section 5.2.1.
Table 6 provides summary statistics of the total connectedness and state variables. In
line with the previous results in section 5.1, the mean value of total connectedness of level
factor is larger than that of slope factor, followed by that of curvature factor. The negative
skewness values as well as kurtosis values nearly 3 indicate that total connectedness
measures seem following right-skewed asymmetric normal distribution. As for CPC first
factor variance explained variable, the range is roughly 13% - 92%, reasonable with large
deviation of 15%.
After standardizing all the variables in Table 7, we obtain the estimated parameters
through (25) in Table 8. In column ’NW’ and column ’HH’, the values in parentheses
under the corresponding estimated parameters, present t-statistics based on Newey-West
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Table 7: Summary of variables
Mean S.t.d. Skew Kurt Min Max
Total connectedness: Level 86.99 2.63 -1.26 3.47 79.61 90.26
Total connectedness: Slope 84.07 4.60 -1.15 3.49 69.52 90.44
Total connectedness: Curvature 78.37 6.09 -0.88 3.66 55.39 89.18
Three month yield change 0.01 1.18 0.22 7.84 -7.00 6.00
Term spread change 0.00 5.76 -0.15 6.24 -48.00 25.00
TED spread 29.35 19.21 2.85 11.67 8.76 133.50
Credit spread change -0.15 2.78 0.34 11.46 -14.00 28.00
Market return 0.05 1.11 -0.27 7.69 -6.90 6.84
Real estate excess return 0.00 0.93 0.01 10.92 -6.00 6.98
VIX 20.17 8.04 1.58 5.27 10.32 56.65
CPC first factor variance explained 50.77 15.06 0.26 2.69 13.35 92.64
Note: Data period: 2009.01.01 - 2015.12.31 with daily data. The change, return data, and CPC factor
variance explained are in percentage. We list the standard deviation (S.t.d.), skewness (Skew), kurtosis
(Kurt) and so on.
Table 8: Determinants of Total connectedness
Level Slope Curvature
NW HH NW HH NW HH
Three month yield 0.010 0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003
change (0.682) (0.590) (-0.490) (-0.385) (-0.197) (-0.184)
Term spread -0.016 -0.016 -0.009 -0.009 0.001 0.001
change (-0.888) (-0.746) (-0.453) (-0.406) (0.025) (0.026)
TED spread 0.125∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗
(2.483) (1.906) (3.286) (2.289) (-4.473) (-5.811)
Credit spread 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.042∗ 0.042∗
change (3.035) (2.107) (2.108) (1.631) (1.543) (1.644)
Market return -0.046∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.018 -0.018 -0.022 -0.022
(-2.550) (-2.082) (-0.953) (-0.805) (-0.954) (-1.044)
Real estate excess -0.005 -0.005 -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 -0.023
return (-0.260) (-0.213) (-1.061) (-0.950) (-1.078) (-1.110)
VIX 0.298∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.010 -0.120∗ -0.120∗∗
(4.886) (4.545) (-0.170) (-0.151) (-1.428) (-1.924)
CPC factor 0.303∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
variance explained (7.996) (8.543) (11.793) (11.994) (9.119) (7.677)
Adjusted R2 (%) 23.04 23.04 19.91 19.91 29.79 29.79
Note: ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ denotes the significance at the level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ’NW’ presents
that the t-statistics displayed in parentheses are calculated by Newey-West standard errors allowing for
up to 5 periods of autocorrelation. ’HH’ represent the t-statistics displayed in parentheses are calculated
by Hansen and Hodrick standard errors with 5 periods of lag.
standard errors (Newey et al., 1987), and Hansen-Hodrick standard errors (Hansen and
Hodrick, 1980) respectively, both with 5 periods of lag. Besides, the last line reports the
adjusted R2 value of the model.
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In Table 8, higher VIX, higher TED spread, higher credit spread, and lower market return
result in high long term default risk. The short-run connectedness is driven by the TED
spread and credit spread, while the medium-run one is sensitive to the TED spread and
VIX. The CPC factor used to capture the latent common factor is significant across the
LT, MT and ST connectedness, implying the existing latent determinants need to be
discovered more. Overall, the average significance of the conditioning variables reported
in Table 8 show that the state variables do indeed proxy for the time variation in the
total connectedness and particularly in the long-term one.
5.5 Out-of-sample forecasts
To validate the necessity to incorporate the network information while estimating the
CDS curve, we compare the performance between the DNS and the network-perspective
DNS model in forecasting CDS spreads. The forecast horizons are selected as 1 day,
5 days, and 10 days. Following the framework in section 2.3, we report the difference
of root mean squared errors (RMSE)between them. When taking the European crisis
period, from 2011 to 2013, as the out-of-sample forecast period, Figure 9 presents the
results of GS and HSBC bank as examples. Each point denotes the difference between
the RMSE of network DNS model and that of DNS model at each maturity period, and
the resulting negative value in the difference indicates the superiority of the model with
network perspective. One can observe the negative values in the difference of RMSE and
they are homogenously distributed in the majority of maturities, especially as forecast
horizons increase. It reveals that RMSE of forecasting CDS spreads in network DNS
model is smaller than that of DNS model, the network DNS model performs even better
as the forecast horizon increase.
Through overall summarizing the performance of European banks and US banks, we
present the average value of RMSE difference under these two models in Table 9. It
reveals a similar pattern to what has been discovered in Figure 9. More interestingly,
the more frequent negative values shown in the EU group implies that the network in-
formation advantage in forecasting CDS curve seems to be supported more in the EU
area. Predicting the CDS curve in EU banks one has to opt for a network-perspective
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Figure 9: Difference of RMSE of CDS spreads forecast between network DNS model
and DNS model, for horizon h={1day, 5day, 10day}. The left panel lists the values of
Goldman Sachs, the right panel for HSBC bank. The points correspond to different
maturities. The forecast period is 2011.01.01 - 2013.12.31.
DDINetwork_CDS_forecast
35
model. The prediction can be used to decide the timing of entering CDS contract to lock
up the hedge cost in term of default from the buyer side. For the seller side, they avoid
underestimating CDS price after incorporating default spillover through their network.
Table 10 reports the Diebold-Mariano test statistics (Diebold and Mariano, 1995) to
compare the network DNS model versus DNS model forecasts. In the Diebold-Mariano
(DM) test, we conduct a pairwise test on the equality of the mean squared forecast errors
by analyzing the difference between the squared forecast errors of the network DNS model
and the DNS model, e2t,net − e2t = µ + εt. The null hypothesis of equal performance is
that H0 : µ = 0. We focus on the t-statistics of parameter µ, denoted as DM t-stat,
which supports the network DNS model if it is significantly negative (significance level
marked by asterisks). Regardless the forecast horizons, we find the negative DM t-stat are
prevalent for the maturities less than 10Y lying on the CDS curves. In other words, the
network DNS model is superior than the DNS model in out-of-sample forecast, especially
for the EU CDS curves.
Table 9: US and EU: out-of-sample forecast
h 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 20Y 30Y
US
1d 0.156 0.029 0.094 -0.031 -0.102 -0.076 -0.029 -0.026 0.158 0.198
5d -0.132 -0.235 -0.116 -0.356 -0.318 -0.108 0.140 -0.037 -0.031 0.092
10d -0.609 -0.637 -0.209 -0.480 -0.597 -0.566 -0.161 -0.290 -0.121 0.111
EU
1d 0.264 -0.162 -0.110 -0.027 0.091 0.022 -0.018 -0.041 0.048 0.081
5d -0.486 -0.973 -0.516 -0.318 -0.058 -0.098 -0.237 -0.354 -0.174 -0.011
10d -1.580 -1.388 -0.685 -0.446 -0.388 -0.524 -0.700 -0.804 -0.309 -0.014
Note: RMSE difference of CDS spreads forecast between network DNS model and DNS model. The
values of US and EU banks are averaged in total. The forecast period is 2011.01.01 - 2013.12.31.
DDINetwork_CDS_forecast
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Table 10: Forecast comparison between network DNS model and DNS model: DM test
h 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 20Y 30Y
1d
BAC 1.036 2.356∗∗ 0.703 -2.514∗∗ -2.105∗∗ -2.954∗∗∗ -2.389∗∗ -1.286 3.402∗∗∗ 5.344∗∗∗
C 3.259∗∗∗ -2.933∗∗∗ -1.270 -3.529∗∗∗ 0.156 3.543∗∗∗ 4.836∗∗∗ 4.593∗∗∗ -0.968 -1.831∗
GS -3.290∗∗∗ 1.906∗ 4.159∗∗∗ -2.043∗∗ -2.034∗∗ -3.774∗∗∗ -6.257∗∗∗ -3.802∗∗∗ 5.118∗∗∗ 7.390∗∗∗
JPM 3.202∗∗∗ -2.067∗∗ -4.887∗∗∗ -7.285∗∗∗ 0.754 4.240∗∗∗ 4.331∗∗∗ 1.772∗ 1.666∗ 4.398∗∗∗
WFC 1.437 3.347∗∗∗ 7.637∗∗∗ 6.896∗∗∗ -4.741∗∗∗ -9.662∗∗∗ -5.940∗∗∗ -4.403∗∗∗ 10.599∗∗∗ 15.143∗∗∗
DB 2.859∗∗∗ -2.218∗∗ -4.947∗∗∗ -6.677∗∗∗ 2.902∗∗∗ 4.732∗∗∗ 4.827∗∗∗ 2.006∗∗ -1.064 0.292
CBG -2.258∗∗ 4.540∗∗∗ 4.045∗∗∗ 3.719∗∗∗ 0.560 -4.488∗∗∗ -4.772∗∗∗ -1.648∗ 4.138∗∗∗ 5.802∗∗∗
BCS 7.258∗∗∗ -6.434∗∗∗ -6.738∗∗∗ -0.524 8.014∗∗∗ 7.809∗∗∗ 2.624∗∗∗ -1.156 -0.406 2.002∗∗
HBC 3.041∗∗∗ -6.318∗∗∗ -5.654∗∗∗ -2.964∗∗∗ 2.325∗∗ 2.404∗∗ 2.195∗∗ 1.939∗ -3.762∗∗∗ -4.773∗∗∗
UBS -0.533 2.535∗∗ 3.148∗∗∗ 2.773∗∗∗ -3.367∗∗∗ -4.665∗∗∗ -6.062∗∗∗ -7.829∗∗∗ 7.208∗∗∗ 9.688∗∗∗
5d
BAC 0.027 0.242 -0.763 -1.618 -0.896 -0.911 -0.362 -0.615 -0.479 -0.172
C 0.178 -2.284∗∗ -2.459∗∗ -2.490∗∗ 0.840 3.394∗∗∗ 4.498∗∗∗ 3.255∗∗∗ -1.285 -2.572∗∗
GS -2.329∗∗ -1.035 -0.656 -2.747∗∗∗ -2.316∗∗ -1.811∗ -2.223∗∗ -1.913∗ -0.996 -0.412
JPM 0.348 -0.660 -1.559 -2.667∗∗∗ -1.047 0.560 1.347 -0.155 -0.599 0.487
WFC 0.124 0.863 2.756∗∗∗ 2.576∗∗∗ -1.383 -3.892∗∗∗ -2.022∗∗ -1.570 2.431∗∗ 4.420∗∗∗
DB -0.572 -1.703∗ -2.158∗∗ -2.799∗∗∗ -0.073 0.421 0.415 -1.344 -2.286∗∗ -1.383
CBG -2.955∗∗∗ -1.140 -1.377 -1.104 -1.050 -1.748∗ -2.187∗∗ -1.625 -0.613 -0.091
BCS 0.976 -2.924∗∗∗ -2.126∗∗ -0.141 1.372 1.414 -0.485 -1.840∗ -0.852 0.335
HBC -0.993 -3.938∗∗∗ -2.475∗∗ -1.690∗ -0.944 -0.530 -0.559 -0.930 -1.994∗∗ -2.198∗∗
UBS -0.891 0.571 1.185 0.847 -0.731 -1.839∗ -2.878∗∗∗ -2.929∗∗∗ 1.124 2.242∗∗
10d
BAC -0.219 -0.130 -0.349 -0.778 -0.779 -0.958 -0.503 -0.583 -0.438 -0.212
C -0.760 -2.301∗∗ -1.992∗∗ -1.955∗ -0.107 1.855∗ 2.939∗∗∗ 2.075∗∗ -0.405 -1.175
GS -1.896∗ -1.153 -0.888 -1.851∗ -2.224∗∗ -2.579∗∗∗ -2.751∗∗∗ -2.149∗∗ -1.096 -0.605
JPM 0.031 -0.726 -1.051 -1.710∗ -0.890 -0.301 0.041 -0.807 -0.771 -0.034
WFC 0.111 0.588 2.065∗∗ 2.056∗∗ -0.140 -2.124∗∗ -1.075 -0.871 1.405 2.838∗∗∗
DB -1.265 -1.098 -0.891 -1.489 -0.981 -0.972 -0.782 -2.014∗∗ -1.792∗ -0.995
CBG -2.696∗∗∗ -1.534 -1.379 -1.079 -0.985 -1.220 -1.464 -1.299 -0.787 -0.449
BCS -0.295 -1.843∗ -1.256 -0.170 -0.154 -0.789 -2.253∗∗ -3.134∗∗∗ -0.901 0.334
HBC -2.296∗∗ -3.564∗∗∗ -2.595∗∗∗ -2.037∗∗ -1.758∗ -1.426 -1.555 -1.750∗ -1.405 -1.086
UBS -0.964 0.029 0.614 0.609 -0.127 -1.086 -2.235∗∗ -2.289∗∗ 0.780 1.726∗
Note: This table gives the t-statistics of Diebold-Mariano test, that is H0 : µ = 0 in the regression e2t,net − e2t = µ+ εt where et,net
and et denote the forecast error of network DNS model and DNS model respectively. The test is modified with robust Newey-West
variances for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation with the lags equal to the forecast horizon. ∗ denotes a significance level of




Systemic risk, the risk of disruption to financial services, can be teased out directly
through an investigation tagging to CDS curves, in comparison with the conventional
market-based approach by using stock returns as alternatives such as the CoVaR measure.
This study shows the information content of a CDS curve for its term structure implication
corresponding to particular credit horizons. The changing shape of credit curve implies
the credit deterioration over different time frames (ST, MT or LT), which can be used to
manage the credit exposures with different maturities.
The existant literature has paid insufficient attention on the shape of CDS curve, the
dynamics of CDS curve and the comovement or interplay between curves. We contribute
to the existing literature by (1) using the DNS model to extract the ST, the MT and
the LT default factor from a CDS curve; (2) quantifying the comovement of CDS curves
through a total connectedness measure to reflect the firms being downgraded simultane-
ously; (3) measuring the default spillover in the ST, MT and LT perspective, respectively;
(4) conducting out-of-sample prediction for CDS curves based on the network-based DNS
model.
The evidence from G-SIBs banks shows that the CDS curves comove tightly with higher
connectedness, especially in the long-run. The US banks contribute more to the long-run
default spillover before 2012, whereas the European banks are major default transmitters
during and after the European debt crisis either in the long-run or short-run. The time-
varying default connectedness and spillover can be viewed as an indicator for monitoring
systemic default risk, especially for identifying the trouble makers triggering a clustered
default in a system. We find that the TED spread, credit spread and VIX are main
determinants of default connectedness. The outperformance of the network DNS model
indicates that the prediction on CDS curve requires network information.
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7.2 Common principal component analysis (CPCA)
Here we introduce the maximum likelihood estimation procedures of CPC under the
hypothesis in (26). The theoretical proof and the asymptotic properties of the estimates
are referred to Flury (1984) and Flury and Gautschi (1986).
Let Si be the (unbiased) sample covariance matrix of an underlying K-variate normal
distribution NK(µ,Ψi) with sample size ni. Then niSi follows a Wishart distribution
with degrees of freedom ni − 1, Härdle and Simar (2015)
niSi ∼ WK(Ψ, ni − 1) (27)
Hence for N Wishart matrices Si with sample size ni, the likelihood function is














where C is a constant not depending on the parameters Ψi. Maximizing the likelihood is






log |Ψi|+ tr(Ψ−1i Si)
}
(29)













We impose the orthogonal constraints in Γ by using the Lagrange multipliers µj for the
K constraints γ>j γj = 1, and using the multipliers µhj for the remaining K(K − 1)/2
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Figure 10: CDS spreads data
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constraints γ>h γj = 0 for (h 6= j). Hence the Lagrange function is
g∗(Γ,Λ1, ...,ΛN) = g(·)−
K∑
j=1






Taking partial derivatives with respect to all λim and γm, the solution of the CPC model










γj = 0, m, j = 1, ..., K, m 6= j. (31)
This is solved using




0 m 6= j
1 m = j
. (32)
Flury (1984) proves existence and uniqueness of the maximum of the likelihood function,
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